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In September 2011 it was decided to reinforce the prevailing framework of budgetary rules in 
Spain with the approval of a constitutional reform. The reform enshrines in the Constitution 
the obligation for all tiers of general government to adjust their conduct to the principle of 
budgetary stability.1 Subsequently, on 27 April 2012, the Organic Law of Budgetary Stabil-
ity and Financial Sustainability (LEP by its Spanish abbreviation) implementing this consti-
tutional reform was approved, replacing the stability laws in force. The LEP made signifi-
cant amendments to the definitions of and the mechanisms for determining the deficit, 
debt and public spending limits applicable to the different levels of government, along with 
changes in correction procedures and mechanisms in the event of slippage.
The new budgetary rules and their legal place in the Constitution respond to a tendency 
observed in the other European countries, and reflected in various reforms recently intro-
duced into the institutional architecture of the monetary union.2 Indeed, the economic 
policy response to the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area is broad-based and includes, 
among other aspects, a review of the EU’s economic governance framework. The budget-
ary area has seen the approval, firstly, of a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
aimed at reinforcing its implementation, which includes an amendment of its preventive 
arm with the incorporation of spending developments into the assessment of the coun-
tries’ compliance with medium-term budgetary objectives, the strengthening of the public 
debt criterion, and the introduction of new reporting obligations and financial sanctions for 
euro area countries which will be applied earlier than at present and more gradually, and 
whose approval will be more automatic. The reform also acknowledges the importance of 
an appropriate definition of the fiscal frameworks not only at the European level but also 
domestically; accordingly, Member States are bound to comply with a series of minimum 
requirements in their budgetary frameworks in order to contribute more effectively to 
achieving budgetary stability. Further, in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Govern-
ance (TSCG), an inter-governmental agreement signed by the European Council on 2 March 
2012, the countries undertake to maintain their structural balance in equilibrium and to 
pass through this commitment to their domestic legal systems and, preferably, to their 
Constitutions. 
It is against this background that the reform of the budgetary framework in Spain, which 
this article analyses in detail, has taken place. In this connection, the following section 
reviews and analyses the quantitative caps on the deficit, debt and public spending laid 
down in the new framework, while the third section examines those cases in which the law 
allows slippage from these thresholds. The reform includes a transitory period running to 
2020 in which to move gradually towards the reduction of the deficit and of debt from the 
current levels to below the limits set. The provisions relating to this transitory period are 
analysed in the fourth section. The article concludes with a box that summarises the pro-
cedures for setting objectives and for monitoring and controlling their fulfilment in accord-
ance with the LEP. The final section draws conclusions. 
Introduction
1  See Hernández de Cos (2011).
2  See Caballero et al (2011).
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The Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability sets three types of restrictions on 
general government conduct: they may not run a budget deficit in structural terms; public 
spending growth shall, at most, be that of the economy’s nominal potential growth; and the 
public debt/GDP ratio may not exceed 60%. These limits are described and analysed below.
The LEP sets a cap on the budget deficit defined in structural terms as opposed to apply-
ing it on the basis of the actual deficit as was the case in previous budgetary stability laws. 
Specifically, it establishes that the State and regional governments (RG) may not incur a 
structural deficit.3 This criterion does not apply, however, to local government (LG) and 
Social Security Funds, which shall maintain a budgetary position in equilibrium or in sur-
plus, and not only in terms of the related structural balance.4
The estimate of the structural deficit is obtained as the difference between the actual deficit 
and the cyclical deficit,5 with the latter being calculated through the application of the elastici-
ties of public revenue and public spending to the difference, or output gap, between actual 
GDP and potential or trend GDP. Various methods are available in the economic literature to 
estimate the output gap and elasticity of public revenue and public spending. The Law has 
opted to apply the method currently used in the European Union, i.e. the cyclically adjusted 
deficit, net of exceptional and temporary measures, developed jointly by the European Com-
mission and the Member States.6 Specifically, this method draws on the estimation of potential 
GDP based on a production function, which requires that each of its components (employ-
ment, capital and total factor productivity) be assessed in terms of their potential values7 8. As 
Quantitative caps on the 
deficit, debt and public 
spending
THE CAP ON THE BUDGET 
DEFICIT IN STRUCTURAL TERMS
3  It should be recalled that TSCG rules set a cap on the structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP, although a structural 
deficit of, at most, 1% of GDP is allowed if the public debt/GDP ratio is significantly below 60% of GDP and the 
risks to the sustainability of public finances in the long run are low. The preventive arm of the SGP establishes 
the need to attain the medium-term objectives (MTO), which are also defined in terms of the structural deficit. In 
its Stability or Convergence Programme, each Member State presents its own medium-term budgetary objec-
tive, which may not exceed that derived from the agreed methodology for calculating it, and this is assessed by 
the Ecofin. These objectives are revised when a major structural reform is undertaken and, in any event, every 
four years. In Spain’s case, according to the methodology for calculating the medium-term objectives agreed by 
Ecofin in July 2009 [European Commission (2010)], the structural deficit may rise to around 0.5%, although the 
updated 2009-2010 Stability Programme set this objective as a structural balance in equilibrium, which was 
maintained in subsequent Stability Programmes. 
4  In the case of LG, the previous stability law allowed the bigger municipal councils to run a deficit of up to 0.05% of 
GDP when economic growth was less than 2%. In this respect, it should be borne in mind that LG revenues may show 
a certain cyclical response given that they have a share in the State’s tax receipts (which depend on the business 
cycle) and, in the case of the major municipal councils, they are assigned a percentage of personal income tax, VAT 
and excise duties. Accordingly, compliance with the limits set in terms of the actual zero budget balance will apply to 
these LG entities, which will be obliged to attain a structural surplus in expansions, enabling them to offset the adverse 
impact on tax revenue at times of slowdown without having to apply compensatory adjustment measures. 
5  Calculation of the structural balance also requires that this balance be adjusted for temporary or exceptional factors.
6  See Denis et al (2006) and Ministerial Order ECC/2741/2012 of 20 December 2012 on the methodological imple-
mentation of Organic Law 2/2012 of 27 April 2012 on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability relative to 
the calculation of the trend forecasts of revenue and expenditure and of the Spanish economy’s reference rate.
7  In the case of the stock of capital, it is estimated on the basis of a dynamic capital accumulation equation in which 
the capital for the period is equal to gross investment plus the capital of the previous period and less depreciation. 
As to potential employment, this is estimated on the basis of the working-age population (15-64), the potential par-
ticipation rate, the number of potential hours worked per employee and the NAWRU (non-accelerating wage rate of 
unemployment). Both the participation rate and the number of potential hours are obtained by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter to the series observed (or forecast). The NAWRU is estimated as the non-observable component 
of a Phillips curve that includes the acceleration in the share of wages in GDP, labour productivity and the terms of 
trade (defined as the difference between the growth rate of the GDP deflator and that of private consumption) as 
regressors. The weights of the labour and capital factors are set at 0.65 and 0.35. Finally, potential TFP is obtained 
as an estimate of the trend of the annual residual of GDP once the contribution of labour and capital is stripped out. 
8  The sample period of the estimate runs from 1980 up to six years following the current year (t) and estimation is 
with annual data. This span is necessary in order to avoid the problem of the sensitivity of the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter to the information available at the extremes of the sample. For the extension of the series, macroeconomic 
forecasts from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness for the period from t to t+3, while the series of 
hours worked, participation rates and TFP are extended between t+4 and t+6 by means of the application of 
ARIMA models. As to the population projections, INE short-term estimates are used.
BOX 1PROCEDURE FOR SETTING OBJECTIVES, AND MONITORING AND CONTROL OF THEIR FULFILMENT
The new Budgetary Stability Law establishes a very detailed pro-
cedure for the annual setting of budgetary objectives for the over-
all general government sector and its agents. Further, it details 
the mechanisms for the monitoring of the fulfilment of these ob-
jectives, it establishes significant improvements in terms of trans-
parency of public finances and it provides for a set of instruments 
to prevent slippage or to redress it should it arise. This box details 
the main aspects of the new legislation in relation to these issues. 
1  Procedure for setting budgetary objectives and their monitoring 
 —  Before 1 April each year (t), the Ministry of Financial Affairs 
and Public Administration (MHAP) shall make a proposal 
for the setting of the stability and public debt objectives for 
the three following years both for the general government 
sector and for its sub-sectors. The proposal shall be for-
warded to the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (CPFF) 
and the National Local Government Council (CNAL), which 
shall have 15 days to issue a report on the matter.1
 —  Following the report by the CPFF and the CNAL, the gov-
ernment shall set the stability objectives, including the 
State spending limit, in the first half of the year (t). The reso-
lution of the Council of Ministers shall be sent to Parliament 
for its approval. 
 —  Once the objectives for each sub-sector have been ap-
proved, MHAP shall propose the individual objectives for 
each RG to the CPFF, and the latter shall then issue a report 
within 15 days. Subsequently, the government will approve 
the objectives for each RG. 
 —  The preparation of the draft budgets of all general govern-
ment tiers will accommodate themselves to these objec-
tives. In particular, the RG and LG shall approve their 
spending limits, before 1 August, and send the essential 
outlines of their next budgets, before 1 October, to MHAP, 
which shall report on how suited they are to the objectives 
before 15 October. 
 —  In the first quarter of the following year (t+1), MHAP shall re-
port to the government on the degree of compliance with the 
stability and public debt objectives in the initial general gov-
ernment budget and on compliance with the spending rule in 
the same initial budget for the case of CG and the RG.
 —  Before 1 October in the following year (t+1), MHAP shall 
submit a report to the Government on the degree of com-
pliance with the rules in the previous year (t), which will also 
include a forecast on compliance in the current year. 
2  Improved transparency
 —  The budgets of all general government tiers should include 
exact information so as to relate the balance of revenue 
and spending in the budget to net lending or net borrowing 
according to the European System of Accounts (ESA). 
 —  Minimum reporting requirements are laid down for RG and 
LG, including most notably monthly outturns of RG revenue 
and spending, and quarterly outturns in the case of LG, 
along with all the information needed to calculate the budg-
et outturn in terms of national accounts.2 Thus, from June 
2012, the IGAE began to regularly publish quarterly ac-
counts of all the general government sub-sectors in terms 
of ESA 95. Also, since October 2012, MHAP has been reg-
ularly publishing RG monthly accounts in terms of budget-
ary accounts and, since March 2013, RG and Social Secu-
rity monthly accounts in terms of national accounts.
3  Non-compliance prevention mechanisms
 —  The Government shall warn RG or LG if they perceive a risk 
of the stability, debt or spending rule objective not being 
met. After this warning, the responsible level of government 
shall take measures within one month to redress the situa-
tion. Should it not do so, or if MHAP considers the meas-
ures are not sufficient, some of the coercive measures en-
visaged in the Law shall be imposed. 
 —  An automatic prevention system is established when debt 
stands above 95% of the limits set in the Law.3 In this case, 
the only debt operations allowed will be treasury-related 
ones. 
 —  For the case of the Social Security sub-sector, if the Gov-
ernment projects a pensions system deficit in the long run, 
it must automatically revise the sustainability factor envis-
aged in Law 27/2011 of 1 August 2011 on the updating, 
reform and modernisation of the Social Security system.
4  Non-compliance correction mechanisms
 —  The Law states that the level of government which exceeds 
its public debt limit may not enter into net debt operations. 
Likewise, if the budgetary stability or public debt objectives 
are not met, all RG debt operations and all LG long-term 
operations will require State authorisation.4 5
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1  The proposal shall be accompanied by a report assessing the economic 
situation over the time horizon for the setting of the objectives. The report 
shall be drafted by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Competitive-
ness (MEC), further to consultation with the Banco de España, and bear-
ing in mind the forecasts of the European Central Bank and of the EC. 
2  Ministerial Order HAP/2105/2012 of 1 October 2012 implementing the 
reporting obligations envisaged in Organic Law 2/2012 of 27 April 2012 
on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability. 
3  In the transition period to 2020 the percentage considered shall be 100%.
4  Or, if appropriate, of the RG that has financial stewardship of the LG. 
5  Moreover, in the case of the RG, if one of these objectives or the spend-
ing rule is not fulfilled, a mandatory and binding report by MHAP will be 
needed for the granting of subsidies or the signing of agreements by CG 
with the RG in question.
 —  When, in normal circumstances, CG, RG or LG fail to meet 
the budgetary stability, public debt or spending rule objec-
tives, they shall draw up a Financial Economic Plan (FEP) 
providing for the correction of the slippage within 1 year. If 
the exceptional circumstances envisaged in the Law occur, 
the emergence of slippage will require the submission of 
rebalancing plans (RP) that include the paths envisaged to 
attain once more the budgetary stability or public debt objec-
tive.6 In that case, the Law sets no deadline for correction.
 —  MHAP shall report quarterly on the monitoring of all ongo-
ing FEP and RP. If, in any report, slippage in the application 
of the measures were to be verified, the level of govern-
ment responsible shall be required to correct it. If, in the 
following quarterly report, it is verified that the measures of 
the plan have not been complied with and that this may 
lead to non-compliance with the stability objective, MHAP 
may impose the coercive measures envisaged in the Law.
 —  In the event of non-compliance with the FEP or RP, the LEP 
stipulates the obligation for the level of government re-
sponsible to approve, within 15 days from the non-compli-
ance occurring, the non-use of appropriations to ensure 
compliance with the objective. In parallel, a sanction shall 
be established, consisting of the obligation to set aside a 
remunerated deposit at the Banco de España equivalent to 
0.2% of its GDP.7 Should the pertinent corrective measures 
not have been applied within three months, the deposit will 
cease to generate interest and if, following a second three-
month period, non-compliance persists, the Government, 
on the proposal of MHAP, may resolve that the deposit be 
converted into a fine. If, after a further three-month period 
following the setting of the fine, the necessary measures 
have still not been adopted, the Government may resolve 
to send a delegation of experts who will have to submit a 
proposal of mandatory measures. 
 —  In the case of the RG, if the resolution on the non-use of 
appropriations were not adopted, or if the obligatory de-
posit were not set aside or the measures proposed by the 
above-mentioned delegation of experts were not accepted, 
the Government would require the president of the RG to 
see through the measure that has not been carried out. If 
this requirement is not met, the Government, with the ap-
proval by absolute majority of the Senate, shall adopt the 
measures necessary to ensure forcible execution by the 
RG. A similar procedure is envisaged for LG. In this case, 
persistent non-compliance may lead to the dissolution of 
the local government bodies responsible.
BOX 1PROCEDURE FOR SETTING OBJECTIVES, AND MONITORING AND CONTROL OF THEIR FULFILMENT (cont’d)
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6  Both FEP and RP shall be drawn up within one month from the time non-
compliance is noted or exceptional circumstances discerned, respec-
tively, and their implementation shall take no longer than three months. 
In the case of CG, the plans shall be drawn up by the Government (on 
the proposal of MHAP) and sent to Parliament for approval. If they are 
rejected, the Government will have one month to submit a new plan. In 
the case of the RG, the plans formulated by them shall be sent to the 
CPFF and, if they are not considered appropriate, the CPFF shall call on 
the RG to submit a new plan. If a plan is not submitted within the speci-
fied period or is rejected again, MHAP may impose the coercive meas-
ures set out in the draft legislation.
7  Moreover, like the previous regulations, the draft law establishes that if 
sanctions are applicable to Spain under European regulations, the por-
tion applicable to them shall be transferred to the levels of government 
responsible.
to the elasticities of the fiscal variables with respect to the cycle, these are estimated for 
personal income tax, corporate income tax, indirect taxes and social security contributions in 
the case of revenue; and for unemployment benefits and other primary expenditure in the 
case of spending (see Table 1).9 The aggregate sensitivity of the budget balance to the busi-
ness cycle can be obtained as the weighted sum of these elasticities of public revenue and 
spending, where the weights are those of the various revenue and spending items as a pro-
portion of nominal GDP. Assuming a constant revenue and spending structure, the European 
Commission sets this cyclical sensitivity of the Spanish budget balance at a value slightly 
higher than 0.4. The cyclical component of the deficit in each year is thus obtained by multi-
plying this sensitivity by the output gap (expressed as a percentage of potential GDP). Finally, 
as earlier mentioned, the cyclically adjusted component of the deficit is obtained as the dif-
ference between the actual budget balance and its estimated cyclical component. 
From the standpoint of fiscal policy design, the main advantage of setting the budget 
deficit cap in structural terms is that it enables its stabilising character to be preserved. In 
9  See European Commission (2005).
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fact, the cyclical component of the deficit falls (increases) in periods of economic expan-
sion (recession), given that public revenue tends to grow (diminish) and public spending to 
fall (increase) simply as a result of the operation of the automatic stabilisers, generating a 
stabilising effect on the economy. Insofar as the caps on the structural deficit do not affect 
the course of the cyclical component of the deficit, a rule thus defined allows for the free 
play of these automatic stabilisers. Moreover, it might allow fiscal policy to play a counter-
cyclical discretionary role, beyond that derived from the automatic stabilisers, but that 
would call for structural surpluses to be attained in economic boom periods. Hence, on the 
basis of the estimates of the general government cyclical balances made by the European 
Commission for the 1995-2012 period, a hypothetical application of the zero structural 
deficit rule would have been consistent with oscillations in the general government bal-
ance ranging from a maximum deficit of 2.2% of GDP in 2010 to a surplus of 1.1% of GDP 
in 2000 (see Chart 1). 
The main practical difficulty in defining the budget deficit cap in structural terms arises 
from the fact that this variable is not observable and has to be estimated, with the eco-
nomic literature, as stated, providing different methods that offer likewise different results. 
The advantage of deciding to use the reference methodology provided by the European 
Commission is that it is known to and can be readily replicated by analysts, and it avoids 
the discrepancies that might arise between the national rule and that established at the 
European level by the application of a different methodology, which makes it easier to 
monitor the public finances situation from the standpoint of compliance with Community 
commitments. In any event, it should be borne in mind that estimates of the structural 
deficit are frequently subject to revision, whether this be due to the incorporation of fresh 
(budgetary or macroeconomic) information or to potential forecasting errors, given that these 
estimates require the use of macroeconomic projections.10 The new LEP does not establish 
differentiated treatment in the event of structural deficit revisions arising, something which 
SOURCES: IGAE (National Audit Ofjce) and Ministerial Order ECC/2741/2012 of 20 December 2012.
Elasticities
[1]
Weights of 
revenue/spending in GDP 
(average 1995-2012)
[2]
Cyclical sensitivities
[3] = [1] x [2] / 100
Total taxes and social security contributions 1.08 33.8 0.36
    Personal income tax 1.92 7.0 0.13
    Corporate income tax 1.15 2.9 0.03
    Indirect taxes 1.00 10.9 0.11
    Social security contributions 0.68 13.0 0.09
Total current primary expenditure -0.16
    Unemployment insurance -3.30 1.8 -0.06
    Other primary expenditure -0.03 31.7 -0.01
General government cyclical sensitivity 0.43
ELASTICITIES OF PUBLIC SPENDING AND REVENUE TABLE 1 
10  In this respect, Kempkes (2012), using data for the OECD countries, finds evidence that there is a significant 
bias for the output gaps estimated in real time to be more negative than those estimated using final data. The 
scale of the bias is between -0.6% and -0.5% of potential GDP on average in all countries and periods, mean-
ing that the use of estimated output gaps in real time would have enabled governments to record higher 
budget deficits than those that would have arisen from an estimate based on the use of final data. The results 
also show that the source of these biases would be due, above all, to systematic errors in the macroeconomic 
projections and not so much to the method for estimating potential output. 
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does occur in the fiscal rules applied in some countries.11 Furthermore, setting a limit on the 
structural deficit that is applicable not only to the State but also to the RG raises the ques-
tion of the estimation of this structural balance at the level of each tier of government. In this 
respect, and as stipulated under the new stability law, Ministerial Order ECC/2741/2012 of 
20 December 2012 details the methodology for distributing the estimated overall general 
government structural deficit among the different agents. Specifically, it was opted to use 
the same output gap measure for all general government levels and the State, namely that 
resulting from the application of the above-mentioned methodology at the European level. 
This decision is warranted by two types of argument. On one hand, the difficulty entailed by 
estimating an output gap measure which differs across RG and which, in turn, is compatible 
with the aggregate measure used in the context of the SGP. On the other, it is argued that the 
cyclical synchrony between the RG is very high, despite the fact that the dispersion of the 
RGs’ real GDP growth rates may, some years, be high, which might in the odd case pose 
practical implementation problems for the principle of a single output gap (see Chart 2).12
It has also been opted to use the same value of the revenue and expenditure elasticities 
for the State and all the RG (see Table 1). In turn, the cyclical sensitivities of each level of 
SOURCE: AMECO (updated 22 February 2013).
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SOURCES: Spanish Regional Accounts and Banco de España. The broken vertical lines highlight the distance between the maximum and minimum growth in a 
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11  In the case of the German constitutional rule, the ex post result of the structural balance is adjusted for the error 
in the real GDP forecast. In the case of the Swiss constitutional rule, however, when there is a deviation from 
the rule limit derived from a projection error, this is included in its entirety in a notional account, which only re-
quires adjusting if it exceeds a specific threshold.
12  For instance, in 2009, although real GDP for the economy as a whole contracted by 3.7%, the extremes stood 
between the declines of 6% for the Valencia region and of 2.4% for the Madrid region. 
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government are obtained as the weights of the various revenues and expenditures that are 
considered cyclical (as a percentage of national GDP) multiplied by the related elasticities. 
Thus, when calculating structural balances, the only factor that can determine differences 
in the impact of the cycle across governments is the presence of discrepancies in the 
weights of public revenue and spending. In particular, governments in whose accounts the 
most cycle-sensitive items account for most weight, as may be the case with, for example, 
unemployment spending, social security contributions or personal income tax, will have a 
comparatively bigger cyclical balance13. For the purposes of the distribution of the cyclical 
balance the Social Security System is integrated into Central Government (CG) since, as 
the ministerial order indicates, unemployment benefits – a markedly cyclical expenditure 
item – may be financed interchangeably by contributions, taxes or debt.
Table 2 presents an exercise of how the distribution of the cyclical balance across the general 
government sub-sectors would have been in 2011 applying the above-mentioned methodol-
ogy. Here use is made of the output gap estimate for that year made by the EC in its 2013 
Winter Report14, the elasticities of public revenues and expenditure in Table 1, and approxi-
mate weights of the share by agent in revenue and expenditure based on IGAE (National Audit 
Office) data.15 As was to be expected, the CG aggregate would account for some 70% of the 
total for the cyclical balance, owing to the effect of the Social Security System (in both its rev-
enue and expenditure facets), while the RG would be assigned 25% and LG the remaining 5%. 
Output gap 
in 2011 (a)
Elasticities
Central 
Government 
and Social 
Security
Regional 
Govern-
ment
Local 
Govern-
ment
Central 
Government 
and Social 
Security
Regional 
Govern-
ment
Local 
Govern-
ment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[6] = [1] x 
[2] x [3]
[7] = [1] x 
[2] x [4]
[8] = [1] x
[2] x [5]
Total revenue -0.88 -0.40 -0.12
    Personal income tax -4% 1.92 3.79 3.17 0.47 -0.29 -0.24 -0.04
    Corporate income tax -4% 1.15 1.74 0.02 0.11 -0.08 0.00 -0.01
    Indirect taxes -4% 1.00 3.89 3.95 2.03 -0.16 -0.16 -0.08
    Social security contributions -4% 0.68 13.09 0.05 0.03 -0.36 0.00 0.00
Total current primary expenditure -0.40 -0.02 -0.01
    Unemployment insurance -4% -3.30 2.81 0.00 0.00 -0.37 0.00 0.00
    Other primary expenditure -4% -0.03 26.94 17.27 6.77 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
Residual (other revenue) 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cyclical balance -1.25 -0.39 -0.09
Estimated weights as a percentage of 
2011 nominal GDP 
Simulated distribution of the cyclical 
component
DISTRIBUTION OF THE CYCLICAL BALANCE ACROSS THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT SUB-SECTORS TABLE 2 
SOURCES: INE (SNA annexed tables), IGAE (National Audit Ofjce), European Commission and Banco de España.
a European Commission's 2013 Winter Report.
13  In the case of the RG, it should further be borne in mind that some receive transfers from the Guarantee Fund, 
the changes in which over time are linked to State tax revenues, which include State takings for personal income 
tax, VAT and excise duties. The elasticity in respect of the output gap of this basket of taxes is estimated at 1.4. 
14  See European Commission (2013).
15  The heading “Other” has been included to ensure consistency with the cyclical balance that would arise from 
the habitual aggregate approximation which is calculated multiplying the sensitivity of general government to 
the business cycle (0.43) by the output gap. The distribution of the remainder across the sub-sectors has been 
carried out using the weights in other revenue of the various general government sectors. 
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The LEP stipulates that the weight of overall general government debt in GDP may not ex-
ceed 60% as from 2020. This explicit cap on public debt was not envisaged in previous 
stability laws and further reinforces the commitment to budgetary discipline, given that it is 
the key variable for measuring the sustainability of public finances. Indeed, one of the main 
objectives of the reform of the SGP approved in 2011 is to strengthen the operationality of 
the cap set on this variable. Setting a limit on the level of public debt also prevents budget-
ary operations that are not recorded in the budget deficit but that generate an increase in 
borrowing needs from remaining outside the scope of the rule. The rule also gives absolute 
priority to the payment of public debt interest and capital expenses over other budgetary 
commitments, which may prove especially important for dispelling potential doubts over 
the situation of public finances at times of financial instability or deteriorating confidence. 
The LEP establishes the means of distributing the cap of 60% of GDP across the general 
government sub-sectors. A figure of 44% of GDP corresponds to CG, 13% to the RG as a 
whole (this limit is also applied to each of them in respect of their regional GDP) and 3% to 
LG, a very similar distribution to that observed at end-2011, when CG amassed around 
75% of the overall general government debt. Arguably, in principle, CG should have great-
er scope for indebtedness, as established under the law, so as to be better placed to re-
spond to the shocks affecting the country as a whole, and to help smooth the idiosyn-
cratic shocks of each territory or group of territories. Further, their greater accessibility to 
international markets to raise financing might justify a higher threshold. 
Chart 3 plots the debt for each sub-sector in recent years, and the debt caps set. CG and 
LG can be seen to have exceeded the LEP cap in most of the years, with the exception of 
the periods 2002-2009 and 2001-2008, respectively. The RG, for their part, only exceeded 
it in 2011 and 2012. 
In relation to the foregoing and as under the previous legislation, the LEP stipulates that 
CG may not assume the debt commitments of the RG or LG, nor that of the public corpo-
rations reporting to them, and nor may the RG assume LG commitments. This is what is 
known as the non-bailout clause, and its wording in the LEP is very similar to that in the 
Treaty on European Union for relations between Member States. In a country as decentral-
ised as Spain, this clause is crucial in seeking to prevent the costs of inappropriate fiscal 
behaviour at one level of government from passing through to the other tiers, and it is vital 
so that the capital markets may maintain a disciplining effect based on discrimination 
among the risk premia on the debt of the different levels of government. 
THE CAP ON PUBLIC DEBT
SOURCE: Banco de España. Consolidated public debt by General Government sub-sector.
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In any event, the LEP also states that RG and LG may apply to the State for access to 
exceptional liquidity support measures. To do this, the RG in question has to agree on an 
adjustment plan with the Ministry of Financial Affairs and Public Administration (MHAP) 
that ensures fulfilment of the stability objectives. This plan shall be public and include an 
approval, start-up and surveillance timetable. Compliance with the timetable will deter-
mine the tranche-by-tranche disbursement of the financial aid. Moreover, the RG must 
accept the specific monitoring and reporting conditions.16 In this respect, the Government 
has launched various support mechanisms for RG and LG in 2012 and 2013 so as to pro-
vide for the refinancing of their prior debts or for payment to trade creditors. 
The LEP stipulates that the State, RG and LG shall annually approve a non-financial ex-
penditure cap. Specifically, it states that the annual increase in spending (by the State, the 
RG and LG) may not exceed the medium-term GDP growth reference rate set by the Min-
istry for Economic Affairs and Competitiveness (MEC), in keeping also with the European 
Commission’s methodology. In this respect, the ministerial order approved in December 
2012 states that the medium-term growth of real GDP shall be calculated as the mean of 
the estimates of the potential growth of real GDP over the last five years, the estimate for 
the current year and the projections for the following four years. Approximating the spend-
ing cap reference value as a measure of the changes in GDP over 10 years prevents the 
rule from giving rise to procyclical behaviour by public spending. 
To arrive at the nominal potential GDP acting as a reference, the LEP opts to use the (ac-
tual or forecast) annual growth of the GDP deflator, with a maximum of 2%. This limit on 
the increase in the deflator adds a disciplining element to the future course of public 
spending, preventing very high increases in expenditure due to excessive price growth.     
The rule further establishes that the permitted increase in spending should be adjusted for 
the estimated impact of the planned discretionary tax measures, so that when regulatory 
changes entailing permanent increases (reductions) in revenues are approved, the spend-
ing cap may increase (must fall) by the equivalent amount. This adjustment is fully justified 
in order to accommodate the growth in spending to developments in revenue and to pre-
vent fiscal imbalances from arising owing to the approval, for example, of tax cuts not 
accompanied by equivalent reductions in spending. However, it should be borne in mind 
that estimating the impact of tax changes on revenue is not straightforward, and ex ante 
estimates may differ greatly from actual results. Accordingly, it would be advisable peri-
odically to conduct ex post analyses and to accommodate the growth in spending to the 
potential slippage that may arise. 
As regards the spending components subject to the cap, it has firstly been opted to ex-
clude interest payments. This can be justified since this variable lies beyond the control of 
the tax authority, at least in the short term. Moreover, despite the fact that the rule is not 
applied to Social Security Funds, non-discretionary spending on unemployment benefits 
is also excluded. This exclusion will prevent a procyclical bias being generated in public 
spending derived from the application of the rule.17 Finally, also excluded is the portion of 
expenditure financed with specifically earmarked funds from the European Union or from 
THE SPENDING RULE
16  In particular, information should be reported quarterly to MHAP on public guarantees received and credit lines 
arranged, trade debt incurred, derivatives transactions and any other contingent liability.
17  For example, in an economic slowdown there would be an increase in unemployment benefit spending. If the 
rule were applied to this defi nition of spending, that would mean that, to ensure its fulfi lment, other spending 
items would have to be adjusted to offset the growth of total spending above that set under the rule, giving rise 
to procyclical bias in spending.
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other public administrations and State transfers to the RG and LG linked to financing ar-
rangements. The exclusion of these items, with the exception of transfers between general 
government sub-sectors, is equivalent to that incorporated into the 2011 SGP reform.18
The extension to the RG and LG of this rule, which did not exist under the previous legisla-
tion, is particularly important for achieving effective control over spending given the major 
responsibilities exercised by these governments in Spain. As regards Social Security 
Funds, their exclusion essentially entails leaving pension spending (in addition to the 
aforementioned unemployment benefits) out of the rule, which would be consistent with 
the need to maintain a long-term perspective in the financing of these benefits. The an-
nual growth of this item is largely determined by the parameters of the system and demo-
graphic developments, whereby it would be difficult to annually restrict its growth. 
Chart 4 offers a counterfactual exercise of how the spending rule would have worked had it 
been applied in the past. As can be seen, its application in the period of expansion from 1999 
to 2007 would have substantially restricted the permitted annual spending, such that signifi-
cant room for manoeuvre could have been generated that would have restricted the deterio-
ration in public finances from 2009. Moreover, the spending rule is a most useful complement 
to the structural deficit rule since, in periods of economic expansion marked, for instance, by 
an expansion in the real estate market, the habitual calculations of the structural balance 
identify the public revenues usually accompanying these episodes as a structural – as op-
posed to a purely cyclical – improvement. The spending rule allows, however, for the disci-
plining of the trend of this item at such times, facilitating the saving on extraordinary revenues.
Broadly, establishing exceptions to compliance with fiscal limits is understood to be desir-
able and can reinforce the credibility of their fulfilment, provided they are clearly defined. 
In this respect, the new Stability Law stipulates that the State and the regional govern-
ments may incur structural deficits and exceed the public debt caps in exceptional circum-
stances, such as natural disasters, serious economic recessions (defined in keeping with 
European regulations, and where, moreover, a real negative rate of change in GDP accord-
ing to annual national accounts must be posted) or exceptional emergencies19, approved 
The exceptions to the 
rules: the possibility of 
slippage in respect 
of the caps
SOURCE: Hernández de Cos (2011).
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18  In the case of the SGP, the public investment considered for the assessment of the rule is allowed not to be the 
annual figure but a four-year average, in order to prevent the volatility of this variable, especially in small countries.
19  Exceptional emergency situations are understood as those beyond the control of the general government sec-
tors and which considerably impair their financial position or their economic or social sustainability.
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by an absolute majority in Parliament. Social Security Funds may post a structural deficit 
in accordance with the purposes and conditions of the Social Security Reserve Fund reg-
ulations20, while LG must constantly maintain a balanced budget or run a surplus.
The definition of serious economic recession included in the law is somewhat more restric-
tive than that in the SGP, given that, as indicated, it requires that a real negative GDP 
growth rate be recorded.21 Specifically, in the case of the SGP it is stipulated that deficits 
over 3% are not considered “excessive”, provided that the failure to comply is of scant 
significance, temporary and due to exceptional circumstances. The latter include unusual 
circumstances over which the Member State has no control and which bear significantly 
on the financial position of the general government sectors, or a serious economic reces-
sion.22 Following the reform of the SGP in 2005, the latter situation is defined as a negative 
annual real GDP growth rate or a cumulative loss in output over a prolonged period of very 
low real GDP growth in relation to potential growth. For its part, the TSCG retains the same 
escape clauses as the SGP, but in relation to the structural deficit target.
In the case of structural reforms with long-term budgetary effects, the LEP allows for an 
overall general government structural deficit of up to 0.4% of nominal GDP. The LEP defers 
to the European agreements for the definition of which structural reforms allow such slip-
page. In this case, the SGP also allows temporary slippage from the medium-term objec-
tives if there are significant structural reforms with positive long-term budgetary effects23, 
although the SGP places no limit on the scale of the slippage permitted; accordingly, the 
Organic Law is once again more restrictive.
As indicated in the introduction, the LEP stipulates a transition period running from the 
entry into force of the law until 2020, the first year in which the aforementioned structural 
deficit and public debt caps will be applicable. During that period, the reduction in the 
structural deficit shall be at least 0.8% of GDP in annual average terms (with the distribution 
between State and RG based on the structural deficit percentages recorded as at 1 January 
2012). The public debt ratio shall be reduced at the rate necessary to place it below 60% in 
202024 25. These limits shall not be applicable in exceptional situations. Further, the pace of 
reduction of public debt and of the structural deficit shall be reviewed in 2015 and 2018. 
Transition period
20  In this latter case the maximum structural deficit allowed for CG shall be lessened by the amount equivalent to 
the Social Security deficit. 
21  Regarding the definition of “serious economic recession”, it should be clarified whether the annual GDP in question 
is the national output, in which case the clause will be uniformly and symmetrically activated for all the general 
government sectors concerned, or whether, conversely, the potential divergences between GDP for Spain as a 
whole and GDP for a particular RG may lead to an asymmetrical and non-uniform application of the escape clause. 
In this respect, while it is true on average that the presence of negative annual GDP rates of change at the national 
level are usually accompanied by rates of the same sign for each RG, this has not always been the case. In 2010, 
for example, the rate of change of real national GDP was -0.1%, while for six RGs the related rates were positive or 
zero. Positive changes in national GDP between 1990 and 1992 were accompanied by negative rates being posted 
by an average of three RGs per year, something similar to what happened in the 1982-1986 period, in which two 
RGs per annum on average posted negative rates as opposed to positive rates for real aggregate GDP.
22  It shall be considered temporary when the Commission’s budgetary projections indicate that the deficit will be 
below the reference value at the end of the unusual circumstances or the serious economic recession.
23  The SGP refers explicitly to the case of pension reforms that entail introducing a system based on several pillars 
and that include an obligatory “fully funded” pillar.
24  The change in the annual non-financial spending by each tier of government may not exceed the real GDP 
growth rate of the Spanish economy. Moreover, whenever the real GDP growth rate exceeds 2% per annum or 
employment is generated with growth of at least 2% per annum, the public debt/GDP ratio would have to fall 
by at least 2 pp of GDP. 
25  However, if in 2020 public debt does not exceed 60% of GDP, a particular tier of government may exceed its 
specific debt limit provided that it meets the structural deficit criteria. In any event, the related tier of govern-
ment shall reduce its debt over the maximum period established by the SGP taking 2012 as the initial year (i.e. 
approximately 20 years). 
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It should further be borne in mind that, given that the budget deficit exceeds 3% at present 
and that Spain is subject to the SGP’s Excessive Deficit Procedure, the Spanish authorities 
must also comply with the recommendations of the European Council associated with this 
Procedure, which set structural balance adjustments of a specific amount26. Subsequent-
ly, once the budget deficit stands below 3% of GDP, the SGP requirements also establish 
an approximation to the medium-term objective, defined as a structural balance close to 
zero, entailing a minimum adjustment of 0.5% of the structural deficit, which must exceed 
0.5% if the debt is above 60%, as is the case of Spain at present. Lastly, regarding the 
approximation of the public debt/GDP ratio to 60%, the current SGP stipulates an annual 
pace of reduction of 1/20 on average over the last three years the deficit is excessive. 
The new Budgetary Stability Law has marked a substantial step forward in updating the 
framework of budgetary rules applicable to Spanish general government conduct. It in-
cludes a significant set of institutional elements identified by the European Commission as 
“best practices” in terms of legal appropriateness (enshrinement in the Constitution), the 
setting of quantitative limits on the structural budget deficit, debt targets, a public spending 
rule, escape clauses set in the law, surveillance and control procedures for meeting objec-
tives, transparency and explicit inclusion of the cross-government non-bailout principle.
In particular, the application of the Stability Law has already entailed an improvement in 
terms of the transparency of general government conduct, with the regular publication of 
the RG and LG budget outturns. This improvement is particularly significant given that the 
shortcomings in the availability of information on these tiers of government previously 
prevented budgetary slippage being detected in time and delayed the activation of mech-
anisms ensuring that objectives were met. As a result of the application of the Law, the 
information in both the State and RG budgets should be improved, so that the underlying 
assumptions for the revenue and expenditure projections may be known and that informa-
tion is at hand on these items in National Accounts terms, which is the relevant definition 
for the existing fiscal rules. In this respect, a single document offering a detailed view of 
the overall general government budgetary projections for the following year and their com-
patibility with the objectives set might be useful before the end of each year. 
The Stability Law also includes new coercive instruments to ensure compliance with budg-
etary objectives by all levels of government. These include the possibility of establishing 
sanctions, the automatic adjustment of RG spending in specific cases of non-compliance 
and also the imposing of adjustment measures by CG , which RG and LG are bound to 
observe. These new legal mechanisms may prove most effective for ensuring discipline if 
rigorously applied and if the appropriate procedures for overseeing the budgetary outturn 
during the year are set in place. 
The LEP establishes a transitory period, running to 2020, in order to gradually reduce the 
deficit and debt from their current levels and place them below the limits set for that year. 
During this period minimum requirements in respect of fiscal adjustments are mandatory 
and, along with the European Council’s recommendations in the context of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, these will govern the pursuit of budgetary policy over the coming years. Fulfil-
ment of the foregoing requirements will, indeed, call for a most significant and prolonged 
Conclusions
26  For example, the European Council’s Recommendations to Spain on 9 July 2012 aimed at bringing the exces-
sive deficit situation to an end (ECOFIN 12171/12), the latest recommendations available at the time of this ar-
ticle going to press, established the need for an improvement in the structural balance of 2.5% of GDP in 2013 
and of 1.9% of GDP in 2014. 
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fiscal drive in quantitative terms. In this connection it would be useful to set in place a 
medium-term budgetary programme containing projections for the various public reve-
nue and spending items, based on a prudent macroeconomic scenario, and in which the 
various measures – and the quantification of their impact – are detailed, enabling the fis-
cal adjustment to be seen through under the terms laid down in the LEP and the SGP. This 
type of budgetary planning could be conducive to the credibility of the fiscal consolida-
tion process, anchoring agents’ expectations and providing for a far-reaching review of the 
different spending programmes and of the tax system in all levels of general government. 
Finally, it should be recalled that the Government has announced an additional reinforce-
ment of the national budgetary framework with the creation of an independent fiscal insti-
tution which, though still pending approval, will be tasked with fiscal policy analysis, advi-
sory and monitoring functions to ensure government compliance with the principle of 
budgetary stability, and the evaluation of economic forecasts. Such institutions have prov-
en useful in peer countries and could play a key role in entrenching the credibility of budg-
etary policy in Spain. For this, it is vital that the institution is given a degree of independ-
ence, effective responsibilities and resources in keeping with best international practices. 
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